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Abstract
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an
alternative from a nite set and agents may or may not become users of the
chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and
the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given
an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that
We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions that
greatly improved the paper. We have also received very useful comments from Pablo Amorós,
Carmen Beviá, Sandro Brusco, Luis Corchón, Humberto Llavador, Bernardo Moreno, David Pérez-
Castrillo, Socorro Puy, Joaquim Silvestre, Marc Vorsatz, and Ashel Wolinsky. The work of Massó
is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science through grant SEJ2005-
01481/ECON and FEDER and through project CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 (CDS2006-00016),
and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2005-00454 and through the Barcelona
Economics Program (CREA). The work of Nicolò is partially supported by the Italian Ministry of
University and Research through grant 2005137858.
yDepartament dEconomia i dHistòria Econòmica and CODE, Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain. Fax: (+34)935812461. E-mail: jordi.masso@uab.es.
zCorresponding author. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Padova, via del
Santo 33, 35123 Padova, Italy. E-mail: antonio.nicolo@unipd.it. Phone: (+39)0498274285. Fax:
(+39)0498274211.
1
the nal allocation be e¢ cient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user
and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage
sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is
an e¢ cient and stable allocation which also satises a maximal participation
property.
Keywords: Public Goods, Gregarious Preferences, Subgame Perfect Implemen-
tation.
JEL Classication Numbers: D62, D71, H41.
1 Introduction
In many collective choice problems, after the social alternative (or level of a public
good) has been chosen, agents may decide whether or not to use it. If the nal set of
users a¤ects the welfare of each member, then the decision process has to take into
account the set of agents that will eventually become users. In this paper we study
the case when participation is not compulsory and agentspreferences are gregarious
in the sense that they are (set-inclusion) monotonic with respect to the set of users.
There are many examples of such problems. Members of a club choose the amount of
some non-rival public good to be provided to themselves and the cost of its provision
is usually equally shared among the set of its nal users. This choice a¤ects the
composition (and the size) of the club, since some members may choose to leave
the club if the level provided and its corresponding cost are unacceptable to them.
Similarly, a local community which decides to provide a public facility (a swimming
pool, a common garden, etc.) cannot set aside considerations regarding how many
community members support this decision if those who are not in favor of it have the
right to not pay for the facility. Many other problems do not directly involve money
but can be similarly modeled. For instance, a group of nations decides which common
technological standard to adopt. Each country may prefer a di¤erent standard, but
once a standard is adopted, social and individual welfare are increasing in the number
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of nations which agree to adopt it.
All these problems have the common feature that agents also care about the set of
users of the public good. For this reason, and since participation is not compulsory,
the nal allocation has to satisfy not only e¢ ciency but also stability. While the rst
requirement is well-known and desirable in many collective choice problems, the latter
deserves to be briey explained. Stability requires that no agent can be forced to be a
user and that no agent who wants to be a user could be excluded. Stability may be a
necessary requirement due to technological or institutional constraints: for instance,
no nation can be forced to adopt any technological standard, or according to the law
agents can not be forced to contribute to the provision of a public facility, but at the
same time it is impossible or too costly to exclude someone from its consumption.1
The aim of this paper is to implement an e¢ cient and stable social choice function
when agentsgregarious preferences are private information. We focus on the case
where agents have to select a single alternative. Namely, only one level of the public
good can be provided and agents have to decide whether or not to be users of it, but
a subset of agents cannot secede and choose (and use) another alternative.
Our analysis starts by showing that, for any gregarious preference prole, the set
of e¢ cient and stable allocations is non-empty. However, we can easily establish a
negative result: no e¢ cient and stable social choice function is Nash implementable
(because it is not Maskin monotonic). This result is related to previous results in
Jackson and Nicolò (2004) who study similar social choice problems in a context
where agents have single-peaked preferences over an innite and linearly ordered set
of alternatives. They show that, in general, strategy-proof and e¢ cient social choice
functions must x the group of users independently of agentspreferences. Namely,
when gregarious e¤ects are present strategy-proofness and e¢ ciency impose that the
group of users coincide with the entire society. Therefore, stability is incompatible
with strategy-proofness and e¢ ciency. But this result suggests that the trade-o¤
1See also Bogomolnaia and Nicolò (2005) for a brief discussion of the normative content of a
slightly di¤erent denition of stability in the context of multiple provision of public goods.
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between informational constraints and normative properties of social choice functions
could be overcome if we separate the decision of which alternative has to be chosen
from the selection of the group of its users. We therefore investigate if an e¢ cient
and stable social choice function is subgame perfect Nash implementable. We present
a mechanism with two features: rst, it is invariant with respect to the names of the
agents and second, it is simple enough to be implemented in real collective decision
problems. Roughly, the proposed two-stage game is as follows. In Stage 1 agents
sequentially (iteratively and publicly), following an exogenously given order, propose
a level of the public good and a natural number between 1 and the number of agents
(interpreted as the number of users); among the proposed levels, one with the maximal
number of users is chosen (if there are several, one of them is chosen in accordance
with a pre-specied selection rule). In Stage 2 agents sequentially (and publicly),
following the same given order, decide whether or not to use the level of the public
good chosen at the rst stage.
The game is relatively simple: it is nite, bounded, and the needed penalties out-
of-equilibrium play do not have to be large. Interestingly, the unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium outcome of the game does not depend on the order according to
which agents take decisions along the game. We think that this is an important
property should the mechanism be used. The mechanism selects among the set of
e¢ cient and stable allocations an alternative which maximizes the number of its users.
We justify this maximality property on a purely normative ground, since it allows to
minimize the number of agents with the minimum level of welfare.
Finally, our paper is related to Bag and Winter (1999), in which the authors
propose a sequential iterated mechanism to uniquely implement a core allocation
for an economy with an excludable public good. In their model a level of a public
good is produced using a technology and the contributions of a private good made
by the nal set of users. However, our setting is di¤erent from theirs at least with
respect to the following features. First, in our setting exclusion is voluntary (our
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stability notion reects that). Second, their setting is cardinal (preferences are quasi-
linear in the private good) while our ordinal setting not only admits a larger class
of preferences but also admits problems in which the choice of a social alternative
does not generate costs. Third, in their setting e¢ ciency implies no exclusion, and
thus, in the equilibrium outcome of their game all agents consume the public good;
in contrast, in our setting e¢ ciency may require that only a subset of agents be the
nal set of users of the public good.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we give preliminary notation and
denitions, describe the preference domain, establish the existence of e¢ cient and
stable allocations, and provide a negative result for Nash implementation. In Section
3, we describe the mechanism and state our main result. In Section 4, we o¤er some
examples that illustrate the role of some features of the mechanism, discuss its non-
neutrality, and give the relationship between the set of e¢ cient and stable allocations
and the set of group stable allocations. An Appendix at the end of the paper contains
the formal denitions of strategies and outcome functions of the game in extensive
form and collects the proofs omitted in the text.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set of agents and X be the nite set of levels of a public
good (or social alternatives). We assume that n;#X  2. Subsets of N are denoted
by S and T , elements of N by i and j, and elements of X by x and y. An allocation is
a pair (x; S) 2 A  X  2N , where x 2 X is the level of the public good and S 2 2N
is the subset of its users. Agents have preferences over the set of allocations. The
preference relation of agent i 2 N over the set of allocations A, denoted by Ri, is a
complete, reexive and transitive binary relation. As usual, let Pi and Ii denote the
strict and indi¤erence preference relations induced by Ri, respectively. We assume
that preference relations satisfy the following properties:
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(Greg) Gregariousness: For all x 2 X and S; T 2 2N such that i 2 T  S,
(x; S)Pi (x; T ) :
(Apa) Apathy: For all x; y 2 X and S 2 2N such that i =2 S, (x; S) Ii (y; ;) :
(Strict) Strictness: For all x; y 2 X and S; T 2 2N such that i 2 S if (1) x 6= y
or (2) x = y and #S 6= #T hold, then not (x; S) Ii (y; T ).
Gregariousness implies that adding new members to a group of users increases
userswelfare. Notice that Gregariousness does not impose any condition when
comparing two allocations with di¤erent levels of public good. In particular, Gre-
gariousness admits the possibility that agent i 2 S \ T strictly prefers (x; S) to
(x0; T ), for x 6= x0, even if S  T . Moreover, Gregariousness does not imply
anonymity: agent i 2 S \T may prefer (x; S) to (x; T ), even if #S < #T when there
exists some j 2 S but j =2 T: Hence Gregariousness restricts agentspreference to
be positively a¤ected by the enlargement of the set of users, but it also admits that
agents may have non-anonymous preferences over the set of users (i.e., agents are not
only interested in the cardinality of the set of users but also in their identities).2
Apathy says that agent i does not care about the level of the public good if
he does not use it.3 Finally, Strictness requires that agent i is never indi¤erent
between two di¤erent allocations with the properties that i is a user of at least one
of them and the two allocations di¤er either on the level of the public good and/or
on the size of its users.
A preference relation Ri satisfying these three properties is called a gregarious
preference relation and Ri denotes the set of all such preference relations for agent
2A preference relation Ri is anonymous if for all x 2 X and S; T 2 2N such that i 2 S \ T and
#S = #T; (x; S) Ii (x; T ) :
3Note that when the public good to be chosen has some type of externality, even those members
who are not direct users may have strict preferences over which alternative has to be selected. In
these cases (Apa) turns to be too restrictive. Nevertheless in many interesting contexts, like the
provision of club goods, it seems a natural assumption.
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i. Notice that all conditions are agent specic and therefore Ri 6= Rj for di¤erent
agents i and j. We want to stress that the set of gregarious preference relations for
agent i admits preferences with very di¤erent trade-o¤s between the selected level of
the public good and the set of its users; for instance, gregarious preference relations
Ri and R0i might well order (1) (x; fig)Pi(y;N) for x 6= y, and (2) (x; ;)P 0i (x;N). The
reason is that gregarious e¤ects might be relatively small for agent i when compared
with is evaluation of the alternatives. For instance, in (1) y may be considered as
being a very bad alternative compared with x; and in (2), i considers x undesirable
even if all agents use it.
A prole R = (R1; :::; Rn) is a n-tuple of gregarious preference relations. Let
R = R1  Rn be the set of proles. To emphasize the role of agent is preference
relation a prole R is represented by (Ri; R i).
We say that an allocation (y; T ) Pareto dominates the allocation (x; S), denoted
by (y; T )PD(x; S), if (y; T )Ri (x; S) for all i 2 N and (y; T )Pj (x; S) for at least one
j 2 N .
Denition 1 An allocation (x; S) is e¢ cient under R if it is not Pareto dominated
by any other allocation.
Denition 2 An allocation (x; S) is stable under R if for all i 2 N :
(Internal Stability) i 2 S implies (x; S)Pi (x; Snfig).
(External Stability) i =2 S implies (x; S)Pi (x; S [ fig).
Observe that (Apa) implies that if (x; S) is internally stable then, i 2 S implies
(x; S)Pi(x; ;). Given a prole R 2 R, let Z (R) denote the set of e¢ cient and stable
allocations under R. Proposition 1 below establishes the fact that for all R 2 R the
set of e¢ cient and stable allocations under R is non-empty. But rst, we show two
preliminary results concerning e¢ cient and stable allocations. Lemma 1 says that for
each level of the public good x we can nd a (maximal) set of users Sx for which the
allocation (x; Sx) is stable.
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Lemma 1 Let R 2 R be given. For each x 2 X there exists a unique Sx 2 2N
such that (x; Sx) 2 A is stable under R while Sx is set-inclusion maximal among all
T 2 2N where (x; T ) 2 A is stable under R. Moreover (x; Sx) Pareto dominates all
allocations (x; T ) with T 6= Sx that are stable under R:
Proof Let R 2 R and x 2 X be given. For each 1  k  n, dene
Nk(x) =

S 2 2N j #S = k and (x; S)Pi(x; ;) for all i 2 S
	
: (1)
By (Apa), Nk(x) is the family of sets of users with cardinality k that satisfy internal
stability at x under R.
First, suppose
Nk(x) = ; for all k = 1; :::; n: (2)
Then, set Sx = ;: The allocation (x; ;) satises internal stability trivially. Since
N1(x) = ;, (x; ;) is externally stable and therefore stable under R. By (2), there
does not exist T 6= ; such that (x; T ) is stable under R: Hence, the conclusions of
Lemma 1 follow in this case.
Second, suppose there exists 1  k  n such that Nk(x) 6= ;: Let 1  K  n be
such that NK(x) 6= ; and for all k > K (if any), Nk(x) = ;:
Claim 1: #NK(x) = 1.
Proof of Claim 1: Assume #NK(x) > 1: Let S; S 0 2 NK(x) with S 6= S 0: By
(Greg), the denition of NK(x); and the facts that S  S [ S 0 and S 0  S [ S 0
hold, it follows that (x; S [S 0)Pi(x; S)Pi(x; ;) if i 2 S; and (x; S [S 0)Pi(x; S 0)Pi(x; ;)
if i 2 S 0: Hence, S [ S 0 2 Nk(x) for some k > K; contradicting the denition of K:
This ends the proof of Claim 1.
Let Sx be the unique set of users in NK(x):
Claim 2: (x; Sx) is stable under R.
Proof of Claim 2: Internal stability of (x; Sx) directly follows from (1). If (x; Sx)
is not externally stable, then there exists i =2 Sx such that (x; Sx [ fig)Pi(x; Sx).
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By (Apa), (x; Sx)Ii(x; ;): By (Greg), (x; Sx [ fig)Pj(x; Sx) for all j 2 Sx: Hence
Sx [ fig 2 NK+1(x); contradicting the denition of K: This ends the proof of Claim
2.
Claim 3: If (x; T ) is internally stable under R, then Sx  T:
Proof of Claim 3: Assume that (x; T ) is internally stable and there exists
i 2 TnSx: (3)
Consider Sx [ T: By denition of Sx; #Sx = K: Thus, by (3), #(Sx [ T ) > K: By
denition of K; SxnT 6= ;; otherwise, T 2 Nk(x) for some k > K: By (Greg) and
internal stability of (x; T ) and (x; Sx), (x; Sx [ T )Pi(x; Sx)Pi(x; ;) for all i 2 Sx and
(x; Sx [ T )Pi(x; T )Pi(x; ;) for all i 2 T: Hence, Sx [ T 2 Nk(x) for some k > K;
which is a contradiction. This ends the proof of Claim 3.
Assume (x; T ) 2 A is stable under R: Then, (x; T ) is internally stable and, by
Claim 3, Sx  T: Thus, Sx is set-inclusion maximal among all T 2 2N where (x; T ) 2
A is stable under R:
Claim 4: Let (x; T ) be stable under R and T 6= Sx. Then, (x; Sx) Pareto dominates
(x; T ):
Proof of Claim 4: Let (x; T ) be stable under R and T 6= Sx. By Claim 3, T  Sx.
Thus, Sx 6= ;: Hence, by (Greg), (x; Sx)Pi(x; T ) for all i 2 Sx and (x; Sx)Ii(x; T ) for
all i =2 Sx: Thus, (x; Sx)PD(x; T ): This ends the proof of Claim 4 and Lemma 1. 
Since Claim 3 will be used in the proof of Lemma 2 below, we state it as a remark.
Remark 1 If (y; T ) is internally stable under R, then Sy  T:
Observe that gregarious preference proles admit the possibility that the maximal
stable set of users of an alternative x is the empty set. We call the stable allocation
(x; Sx) identied in Lemma 1 the stable and e¢ cient allocation relative to x, and refer
to Sx as the maximal stable set of users at x. As a direct consequence of Lemma 1,
Lemma 2 below states that if (x; Sx) is Pareto dominated, then it is Pareto dominated
by some stable (y; Sy):
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Lemma 2 Let R 2 R and x 2 X be given. Assume (x; Sx) is not e¢ cient under
R. Then there exists y 2 X such that the stable allocation (y; Sy) Pareto dominates
(x; Sx):
Proof Let R 2 R and x 2 X be given. Assume that (x; Sx) 2 A is not e¢ cient
under R. There exists (y; T ) 2 A such that (y; T )PD(x; Sx). Next, we show that
(y; T ) satises internal stability. Assume otherwise; namely, there exists i 2 T such
that
(y; Tnfig)Pi(y; T ): (4)
By (Apa), (y; Tnfig)Ii(y; ;): If i 2 Sx then, by internal stability of the allocation
(x; Sx), (x; Sx)Pi(x; Sxnfig) and by (Apa), (x; Sxnfig)Ii(y; ;). Hence, by (4) and tran-
sitivity, (x; Sx)Pi(y; T ): Thus, (y; T ) cannot Pareto dominate (x; Sx): If i =2 Sx then, by
(Apa), (x; Sx)Ii(y; ;). By (4), (x; Sx)Pi(y; T ) which contradicts that (y; T )PD(x; Sx):
Hence, (y; T ) is internally stable. By Remark 1 and the denition of Sy, either T = Sy
or T  Sy: If T = Sy; then (y; Sy) is stable underR by Lemma 1 and (y; Sy)PD(x; Sx):
If T  Sy; by (Greg), (y; Sy)PD(y; T ): By transitivity of the Pareto dominance re-
lation (y; Sy)PD(x; Sx); and the proof is completed. 
Lemmata 1 and 2 have two important consequences. First, to know whether or
not a stable allocation is e¢ cient it is enough to check that it is not Pareto dominated
by any other stable allocation. Second, given that the set of stable allocations is non-
empty, the set of stable and e¢ cient allocations is non-empty. We state this second
consequence as Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 For all R 2 R, Z(R) 6= ;.
Proof Let R 2 R be given. Consider any stable allocation (x; Sx) under R, whose
existence is established by Lemma 1. If (x; Sx) is e¢ cient under R, Proposition 1
follows; otherwise, by Lemma 2, there exists a stable allocation (z; Sz) under R which
Pareto dominates (x; Sx). Since X is nite and the Pareto dominance relation is
transitive, there must exist a stable and e¢ cient allocation (y; Sy) under R. 
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A social choice function is a mapping ' : R ! X  2N selecting an allocation
for each preference prole. A social choice function is e¢ cient and stable if, for each
R 2 R, the allocation ' (R) is e¢ cient and stable under R.
Information about individual preference relations is often not available to the
decision-maker. In addition, the institution under which the social decision has to
be taken may give to each agent the right to claim as ones own any gregarious
preference relations (even if it is known that this is not the case). Therefore, if we
want the choice of the allocation to be dependent on the preference prole (in the
appropriate way to insure e¢ ciency and stability), we have to design a mechanism
to implement an e¢ cient and stable social choice function. But it is easy to prove
that no e¢ cient and stable social choice function is Nash implementable in the set
of proles of gregarious preference relations. A social choice function ' : R ! A is
Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism (a Cartesian product set of messages
and an outcome function mapping proles of messages into alternatives) such that
for all R 2 R, '(R) is the outcome of all Nash equilibria of the normal form game
induced by the mechanism and the prole R. A social choice function ' : R ! A is
Maskin monotonic if for any R 2 R; R0 2 R; and a = '(R) such that a 6= '(R0) there
exist i 2 N and b 2 A such that aRib and bP 0ia. Maskin monotonicity is a necessary
condition for a social choice function to be Nash implementable.4
Proposition 2 No e¢ cient and stable social choice function ' : R ! X  2N is
Nash implementable.
Proof Let ' : R! X2N be an e¢ cient and stable social choice function. Assume
X = fx; yg and select any proleR 2 R of gregarious preference relations with the fol-
lowing properties: (1) (x;N)P1(y;N)P1(y; ;); (2) for all i 6= 1, (y;N)Pi(x;N)Pi(x; ;);
and (3) for all i 2 N and S 2 2N such that S 6= N and i 2 S,
(z;N)Pi(z
0; S) for all z; z0 2 X: (5)
4See, for instance, Maskin (1999)s original paper or Jackson (2001)s survey on implementation
theory.
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That is, agent 1 prefers alternative x to y; all other agents prefer alternative y to
x, but all agents prefer to be users of their second best alternative with the entire
society than be users of their preferred alternative with a smaller group of users. If
#X > 2 select any prole R 2 R satisfying the additional property that no agent
wants to be a user of any alternative z 6= x; y.5 By e¢ ciency, either '(R) = (x;N)
or '(R) = (y;N):
Assume '(R) = (y;N): The case '(R) = (x;N) proceeds similarly. Consider
now the gregarious preference relation R01 2 R1 with the following property that
(x;N)P 01(y; ;)P 01(y;N) (i.e., agent 1 does not want to use the public good at y, re-
gardless of the set of its users). Hence, by stability, if '(R01; R 1) = (y; S) then 1 =2 S:
Therefore, by e¢ ciency and (5), '(R01; R 1) = (x;N). Hence, Maskin monotonicity
is violated since (x;N) is the best alternative for agent 1 according to R1 and R01.
Thus, the e¢ cient and stable social choice function ' is not Nash implementable. 
Before nishing this section, three remarks are in order.
Remark 2 A natural question is to ask if the non-resolute allocation rule Z which,
at each preference prole R; selects the set of stable and e¢ cient allocations Z(R)
is Maskin monotonic.6 The answer is negative and follows from the observations
that in the proof of Proposition 2, Z(R) = f(y;N); (x;N)g, Z(R01; R 1) = f(x;N)g
(i.e., (y;N) 2 Z(R) and (y;N) =2 Z(R01; R 1)), and for all (z; S) 2 A such that
(y;N)R1(z; S) it holds that, by condition (1) in the denition of R01, (y;N)R
0
1(z; S):
Remark 3 Jackson and Nicolò (2004) showed that, in the continuous version of
our model, there are no strategy-proof, e¢ cient, internally stable, and outsider inde-
pendent social choice functions on the anonymous domain of gregarious and single-
peaked preference relations.7 Since negative implementation results on smaller do-
mains are stronger, observe that the preference prole R 2 R and the preference
5See Massó and Nicolò (2007) for a complete argument.
6A social choice correspondence  : R  A is Maskin monotonic if for all R;R0 2 R and all
a 2  (R) such that a =2  (R0) there exist i 2 N and b 2 A such that aRib and bP 0ia.
7A social choice function ' : R ! X  2N is outsider independent if for all i 2 N; R 2 R and
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relation R01 2 R1 used in the proof of Proposition 2 are anonymous and might be
single-peaked. Hence, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that any e¢ cient and stable
social choice function dened on the anonymous domain of gregarious and single-
peaked preference relations is not Nash implementable.
Remark 4 All the results contained in this section, namely Lemmata 1 and 2 and
Propositions 1 and 2, have been proved without using (Strict), and therefore they
hold without assuming that preferences satisfy this property. In particular, in the
proof of the impossibility result of Proposition 2 we use proles R and (R01; R 1)
with strict preferences. If we enlarge the domain of proles by admitting also pref-
erence relations satisfying (Greg) and (Apa) but not necessarily (Strict), the
impossibility result still holds since the proles R and (R01; R 1) remain in the en-
larged domain. However, (Strict) is a necessary property in order to obtain positive
subgame-perfect implementation results, as Example 4 in Subsection 4.2 will show.
3 The Implementation
3.1 SPNE Implementation: Preliminaries
Given the impossibility to implement any e¢ cient and stable social choice function
as Nash equilibria of a game in normal form, we now address the natural question of
whether or not it is possible to implement some of them as Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibria (SPNE) of a game in extensive form. Our aim is not only to prove that
an e¢ cient and stable social choice function can be implemented in our preference
domain, but also to show that it can be implemented by means of a simple mechanism.
R0i 2 Ri, if i =2 S [ S0 where (x; S) = '(R) and (x0; S0) = '(R0i; R i), then '(R) = '(R0i; R i).
Assume X is endowed with a linear order <. A preference relation Ri 2 Ri is single-peaked if
there exists p (Ri) 2 X such that for all x; y 2 X
y < x  p (Ri) or p (Ri)  x < y implies (x; S)Pi (y; S) ,
for all S 2 2N such that i 2 S.
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Hence, we do not look at those general games proposed by Moore and Repullo (1988),
Abreu and Sen (1990), and Vartiainen (2005 and 2006), who nd general results
for SPNE implementation, but we directly propose a mechanism that can be easily
implemented in real collective decision problems within our framework.
However, it is interesting to note that the no veto power property (that together
with Condition  and n  3 is one of the su¢ cient conditions for SPNE implemen-
tation in Moore and Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990)) does not hold in our
setting. A social choice function ' : R! X2N satises the no veto power condition
if, whenever some allocation (x; S) 2 X2N is top-ranked for at least n 1 agents at
prole R 2 R then '(R) = (x; S): It is easy to see that the no veto power condition is
incompatible with internal stability. Free participation, in fact, must be guaranteed
even if all the other agents have a common preferred allocation, which might require
that the set of users be the full set of agents.
The structure of the problem (the social choice has two components: the level of
the public good and the set of its users) as well as previous results in similar frame-
works (see Jackson and Nicolò (2004) and Bogomolnaia and Nicolò (2005)) suggest
that in order to achieve e¢ ciency and stability the selection of the alternative to be
chosen and the group of its users must be separated. Therefore a two-stage mech-
anism seems to be a natural way to implement an e¢ cient and stable social choice
function. Observe that mechanisms constructed to prove general SPNE implementa-
tion results are unbounded and innite. They contain, for instance, integer subgames
(without Nash equilibria) or large out-of-equilibrium penalties. In contrast, our pro-
posed mechanism has the following simple features: each player has a nite set of
choices and strategies, out-of-equilibrium penalties may be (innitely) small, and all
subgames have Nash equilibria.
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3.2 Maximal Participation
Among the set of e¢ cient and stable allocations we will be specially interested in
those that have the largest set of users. Given R 2 R, dene
MP (R) = f(x; S) 2 Z(R) j #S  #T for all (y; T ) 2 Z(R)g :
Observe that since Z(R) is non-empty and nite, MP (R) 6= ; for all R 2 R. We will
refer to the set MP (R) as the e¢ cient and stable set with maximal participation. In
our setting there is a minimum level of welfare that any agent i can secure; this is the
level that i obtains in any allocation (x; S) where i =2 S: In fact, stability guarantees
that each agent can always refuse to use the public good and, by (Apa), all allocations
where agent i is not a user are indi¤erent for him. Maximality hence guarantees that
the nal allocation minimizes the number of agents with the minimum level of welfare.
Therefore, it is a normative property inspired by a rawlsian maxmin principle.
Since the maximal participation setMP (R)might have several allocations we need
a selection rule on A: Since (x; S); (y; T ) 2 MP (R) and (x; S) 6= (y; T ) imply x 6= y,
it is enough to have a rule to select an alternative from each subset of alternatives.
Let  be a linear order (complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation) on
X: Given a non-empty subset C 2 2Xnf;g, we denote by  (C) the maximizer of 
on C; namely,  (C) = x; where x 2 C and for all y 2 C; y 6= x; x  y: We set
(;) =(X):
3.3 The Mechanism and the Main Result
The mechanism we propose is a two-stage game. In the rst stage agents make
a proposal sequentially, according to the order 1; :::; n, and publicly. A proposal
consists of an alternative and a positive integer (smaller or equal to n) that indicates
the cardinality of the group of users according to the proposers view. Agents can
make a new proposal only if they announce either a new alternative with an equal
or greater cardinality of the group of users or the same alternative with a strictly
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greater cardinality. They can also pass the turn and not make any proposal. The
order is iterated until either all agents have decided to not make a new proposal, or
there are no more feasible proposals left.8 Each proposer has to burden a cost if none
of her proposals has been selected. The alternative with the largest group of users
is selected (in case there are more than one, the chosen alternative is the maximizer
of  on this set). In the second stage, agents sequentially announce (knowing the
outcome of the rst stage) whether they want to be users of the selected alternative
or not. If the number of agents who accept to be users is equal or higher than the
number announced by the agent who made the proposal in the rst stage, then the
nal allocation is the selected alternative and the set of agents who accepted to be
users in the second stage. Otherwise, the nal allocation is ( (;); ;). If the agent
who made the accepted proposal at Stage 1 is not a nal user, he burdens a (larger)
cost: We now dene the mechanism formally.
 Stage 1:
 Step 1: agent 1 proposes either p1 = (x1; k1) 2 X  f1; :::; ng  A or does
not propose anything (identied as the proposal p1 = (NP; 0)).
Assume that m proposals p1; :::; pm have already been made. Dene
A(p1; :::; pm) = fpq j pq = (xq; kq) 2 A for some 1  q  mg:
 Stepm+1: agent i = (m+1) [modn] proposes either pm+1 = (xm+1; km+1) 2
AnA(p1; :::; pm) such that km+1  max fk1; :::; kmg or does not propose any-
thing (pm+1 = (NP; 0)).9
8To iterate the order 1; :::; n we proceed as follows. It is easy to check that each positive integer
m 2 N can uniquely be written as m = tn + r for some t 2 N[f0g and 1  r  n. Dene this
number as r  m[modn]. Then, agent r (where r is between 1 and n) is the agent who has to make
a proposal in step m.
9Observe that, at Step m + 1, if (x; k) has already been proposed at earlier steps and k = km,
the current proposer can propose (z; k) if it has not been proposed yet and z 6= x, but he/she can
not propose again (x; k).
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If after the rst n steps all agents proposed (NP; 0) then the game ends
with the outcome ( (;); ;). Otherwise, let m > 1 be the step where
pm = (xm; km) 2 A and pm+1 =    = pm+n 1 = (NP; 0). Then, Stage 1
nishes at step m+ n  1:
Given p1; :::; pm; dene
x^ =(fx 2 X j 9 1  q  m s.t. pq = (x; k) and k = kmg):
Set k^ = km and {^ = q [modn] where 1  q  m is such that pq = (x^; k^):
Then, the outcome of Stage 1 is (x^; k^; {^) 2 AN ; namely, a proposal (x^; k^)
and its proposer {^.
Each proposer has to burden an "0-cost if none of her proposals is the
selected one at Stage 1, (x^; k^):10
 Stage 2: Each agent j, knowing the outcome (x^; k^; {^) 2 A  N of Stage 1 and
the decision of js predecessors in Stage 2, announces sequentially (following the
same order 1; :::; n) whether he/she wants to use (denoted by u) or not to use
(denoted by nu) the public good at level x^.
The nal set of users of x^ is the set of agents who have announced to be willing
to be a user, only if this set contains at least k^ agents; otherwise, no agent uses
x^. Agent {^; who made the proposal (x^; k^) in Stage 1, has to burden a "00 cost,
worse than the "0 cost of Stage 1, if he is not a user of x^; i.e., either (x^; ;) is
selected, and/or {^ announced nu.
Before stating the main result of the paper, three general comments on the mech-
anism are appropriate. First, the equilibrium outcome of the game is invariant with
respect to the order in which players move along the game (see Massó and Nicolò
(2007) for a proof of this statement). Second, stability imposes a strong restriction
on the set of feasible mechanisms. In ours, Stage 2 makes sure that the outcome is
10See Subsection 4.1 for a discussion on the "-costs.
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a stable allocation. Stage 1, then, has to be designed in order to satisfy maximal
participation and e¢ ciency in the selection of the alternative. Third, the use of a
linear order  as a tie-breaking rule is necessary to guarantee that the implemented
(in SPNE) social choice function ' : R! A treats agents symmetrically, but it makes
the social choice function not neutral. Neutral social choice functions could be easily
constructed (as well the mechanisms to implement them). However a unique selection
should be obtained by breaking the ties in the maximal participation set by means of
an asymmetric treatment of the agents.
The mechanism denes a nite extensive-game form with perfect information.
Denote it by  : Now, given a preference prole R 2 R, let   (R) be the nite game in
extensive form with perfect information (the extensive-game form played by agents
that evaluate outcomes according to the preference prole R). The main result of the
paper states that the game in extensive form  (R) has a unique SPNE outcome which
is a stable and e¢ cient allocation in the set with maximal participation. Formally,
Theorem 1 Let R 2 R be given. The game in extensive form  (R) has a unique
SPNE outcome that belongs to the e¢ cient and stable set with maximal participation.
Proof See Subsection 5.3 in the Appendix at the end of the paper.
Before moving to the next section, we want to emphasize that no agent has to
burden any cost in equilibrium (see Massó and Nicolò (2007) for a proof of this
statement).
4 Final Remarks
4.1 Ordinal Penalties
The only restriction we impose on the " costs we use as out-of-equilibrium threats
is that the "00 cost burdened at Stage 2 by the proposer who is not a nal user be
worse than the "0 cost burdened by the proposers if none of their proposals has been
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accepted (see Example 3 below). A part from this restriction, no other one is imposed;
in particular, to be consistent with our ordinal setting, they may be non-transferable.
But, if we embed the ordinal setting into a cardinal one, these costs can be interpreted
as monetary nes (potentially, innitely small). They are only used in the proof of
our main result to take away from agents the unsubstantial incentives (which exist
due to indi¤erences) of making a proposal that has no e¤ect to themselves (because,
independently of whether or not this proposal is made, the proposer will not use the
nally chosen alternative), yet the proposal has inuence on the outcome of Stage 1.
In our proofs we assume that these costs never induce a preference reversal between
two allocations and therefore, the negative result for Nash implementation still holds.
We have chosen to avoid a formal treatment of these problems in the previous sections.
This would require either to have a cardinal setting or to deal explicitly with these
"-costs in the ordinal setting (Massó and Nicolò (2007) gives the details to deal with
them when preferences are ordinal).
4.2 Extensive-Game Form
Our mechanism is less simple than we would like. First, in Stage 1 the order in which
agents make proposals has to be iterated until all remaining n 1 agents do not make
new proposals (if j reacts to is proposal, for i 6= j, i should still be able to counteract).
Second, proposers have to burden a "0 cost in the case that none of their proposals
has been selected at Stage 1, and the proposer {^ of the chosen proposal at Stage 1
burdens a "00 cost if he is not a nal user.11 In the following examples we show that
these features are indispensable. In each example we consider the extensive-game
form described in Section 3, except that we remove from the original extensive-game
form one of these features.
Example 1 (The order of proposals in Stage 1 is not iterated) Let X = fx; y; zg,
11The idea of using either small penalties or awards in implementation theory is not new (see Abreu
and Mastushima (1994) for penalties and Benoit and Ok (2004) and Sanver (2006) for awards).
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N = f1; 2g, and consider the linear order x  y  z: Take any R 2 R such that12
(z; f1g)P1 (x; f1g)P1 (y; ;)P1 (y; f1; 2g)
and
(y; f2g)P2 (z; ;) I2 (x; ;)P2 (z; f1; 2g)P2 (x; f1; 2g) :
Observe that Z(R) = f(z; f1g) ; (y; f2g)g : It is easy to check that the unique SPNE
outcome of our game is the allocation (z; f1g) and that the same result holds if the
order in which players move is inverted.
Consider our mechanism, except that Stage 1 is played without iteration. The
unique SPNE outcome is the ine¢ cient allocation (x; f1g): Fix now the order 2; 1.
Then, the unique SPNE outcome of the game without iterating the order 2; 1 in
Stage 1 is the allocation (z; f1g): Hence, without the iteration of the order in which
proposals are made in Stage 1 the SPNE outcome might depend on the exogenously
given order, and more importantly, it might be ine¢ cient. 
Example 2 (To make a proposal is never costly). Let X = fx; y; zg, N = f1; 2g,
and consider again the linear order x  y  z. Take any R 2 R such that
(y; f1g)P1 (z; ;) I1 (x; ;)P1 (z; f1; 2g)P1 (x; f1; 2g)
and
(z; f2g)P2 (x; f2g)P2 (y; ;)P2 (y; f1; 2g) :
Observe that Z(R) = f(y; f1g) ; (z; f2g)g : The allocation (z; f2g) is a SPNE outcome
of the game since there exists a SPNE in which agent 1 does not propose anything
in Stage 1 and agent 2 announces (z; 1) at step 2 of Stage 1. However, now, the
ine¢ cient allocation (x; f2g) is also a SPNE outcome of the game since there exists
another SPNE in which agent 1 rst announces (y; 1) and then agent 2 announces
(x; 1). 
12We only list the relevant parts of the preference relations.
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Example 3 (The proposer who is not a nal user does not burden a "00 cost or
the "00 cost is not worse than the "0 cost) Let X = fx; y; zg and N = f1; 2; 3g
and consider the linear order x  y  z. Consider the preference prole R =
(R1; R2; R3) 2 R where
(x; ;)P1 (x; fNg)P1 (y; fNg)P1 (z; fNg) ;
(z; f2g)P2 (y; ;) I2 (x; ;)P2 (y; fNg)P2 (x; fNg) ;
and
(y; f3g)P3 (x; f3g)P3 (z; ;)P3 (z; fNg) :
The SPNE of the game we propose is the allocation (y; f3g). To make the argument
more transparent assume that the " costs are cardinal. Suppose "00 = 0; that is, the
proposer at Stage 1 who is not a nal user does not burden any cost. Then, there is a
SPNE in which agent 1 proposes (x; 1) in Stage 1, no other agent proposes anything
else (since  (C) = x if x 2 C). Therefore, the nal SPNE outcome is the ine¢ cient
allocation (x; f3g):
Consider now the case 0 < "00 < "0. Then, the SPNE outcome is the allocation
(z; f2g) : In fact, agent 2 can play a strategy with the following features:13
f2(p1) =
8<: (z; 1) if p1 = (NP; 0)(NP; 0) otherwise,
and
f5(p1; p2; p3; p4) =
8>>><>>>:
(x; 3) if p2 = (z; 1) and there exists 2 < m  4 such that
pm 6= (NP; 0) and (x; 3) 2 AnfA(p1; p2; p3; p4)g
(NP; 0) otherwise.
Note that to play p5 = (x; 3), under the specic circumstances, is a credible threat
that prevents player 3 to propose (y; 1) at step 3 because "00 < "0: once agent 3
proposes (y; 1) agent 2 prefers to propose (x; 3) than proposing (NP; 0), since he has
13See Subsection 5.1 for a formal denition of strategies.
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to burden the "00 cost instead of the "0 cost. It is easy to see that the SPNE outcome
in this case also depends on the exogenously given order; if agents play according to
the order 3,2,1, the SPNE outcome is the allocation (y; f3g). 
Our last example shows why (Strict) is necessary in order to obtain positive
subgame-perfect implementation results.
Example 4 (Agentspreference relations admit indi¤erences) Let X = fx; yg, N =
f1; 2g ; and consider the linear order x  y. Take any R 2 R such that
(x; f1; 2g)P1 (x; f1g)P1 (y; ;)P1 (y; f1; 2g)
and
(x; f1; 2g) I2 (x; ;)P2 (y; f1; 2g) :
The unique e¢ cient and stable allocation is (x; f1; 2g), but the allocation (x; f1g) is a
SPNE outcome. In fact, there exists a SPNE strategy in which agent 1 proposes (x; 1)
and at Stage 2, agent 2 chooses not to be a user in all information sets. Finally, note
that an alternative to (Strict), which restores the positive implementation result, is
to assume that in case of indi¤erence between the outcomes of two di¤erent actions,
all agents always choose the action that induces the Pareto optimal outcome. But
this is ad hoc since it has no individual strategic justication. 
4.3 Neutrality
The SPNE outcome of the game depends on the liner order  used to select a single
alternative for each possible subset of alternatives. It is natural to ask whether it is
possible to implement the social choice correspondence  : R  A, where for each
R 2 R,  (R) = MP (R): The answer is positive and easy for the case n  3: Let H
be the set of all possible linear orders. Add a preliminary stage in the extensive-game
form in which all agents simultaneously announce some 2 H: Given R 2 R, if at
least n   1 agents announce the same  then they play the game  (R) with the
linear order ; otherwise, the game  0(R) is played with a pre-specied linear order
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0 : It is straightforward to check that, for all R 2 R, the set of SPNE outcomes of
this enlarged game coincides with the set MP (R).
4.4 Group Stability
Our notion of stability refers to individual decisions. According to our denition a
stable allocation is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game played once
the public alternative is already selected (see Berga, Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme
(2006) for more on this interpretation). We now want to establish the relationship
between the set of e¢ cient and stable allocations under R and the set of group stable
allocations under R. We rst state the denition of group stability.
Denition 3 An allocation (x; S) is group stable under R if:
(Internal Group Stability) There does not exist T  S such that, for all i 2 T ,
(x; SnT )Pi(x; S);
(External Group Stability) There does not exist T  NnS such that, for all
i 2 T , (x; S [ T )Pi(x; S):
Lemma 3 Let R 2 R be given. An allocation (x; S) is group stable under R if and
only if it is stable under R and e¢ cient relative to x:
Proof Let (x; Sx) be stable under R and e¢ cient relative to x. Assume that
there exists T  NnSx such that, for all i 2 T , (x; Sx [ T )Pi(x; Sx): Thus, T 6=
;. By (Greg), for all i 2 Sx; (x; Sx [ T )Pi(x; Sx): Hence, for all i 2 Sx [ T ,
(x; Sx [ T )Pi(x; Sx): This contradicts Lemma 1. By (Greg), and because, by inter-
nal stability, (x; Sx)Pi(x; ;) for all i 2 Sx; group internal stability of (x; Sx) follows.
Let (x; S) be group stable under R: By denition, (x; S) is stable under R: If
S 6= Sx; by Lemma 1, #S < #Sx: For all i 2 SxnS  T; (x; S [ T )Pi(x; S): Hence,
external group stability is violated. Thus, S = Sx and (x; S) is stable and e¢ cient
relative to x. 
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5 Appendix
In the rst two subsections of this Appendix we describe formally strategies and
outcome functions of the game in extensive form  (R). Subsection 5.3 contains the
proof of Theorem 1 and a Corollary.
5.1 Strategies
A consumption strategy of agent i in Stage 1 is a choice of a feasible proposal at each
of his information sets. Since the order in which agents make proposals along the
game and proposals are public, each information set consists of a unique node that
can be identied with the history of earlier proposals. Form  1; let hm = (p1; :::; pm)
be a history of m proposals and let Hm be the set of all possible histories of length
m. Set h0 = ; and H0 = fh0g : Observe that agent i plays at step i; given a history
of length i  1; and agent i may have to play at steps k n+ i; for 1  k  K;14 given
a history of length k  n+ i  1: For each m  1 and hm = (p1; :::; pm) 2 Hm; dene
P (hm) =

pm+1 = (xm+1; km+1) 2 AnA(hm) j km+1  km
	 [ f(NP; 0)g
as the set of feasible choices at step m + 1 available to agent (m + 1) [modn] given
the history hm (see Subsection 3.3 for the denitions of A and A(hm)). Hence, a
consumption strategy fi for agent i is a feasible choice for each possible history;
namely,
fi :
KS
k=0
Hkn+i 1 ! A [ f(NP; 0)g ;
with the property that for all hm 2
KS
k=0
Hkn+i 1; fi(hm) 2 P (hm): Let Fi be the set
of consumption strategies of agent i in Stage 1.
Assume that the outcome of Stage 1 is (x^; k^; {^) 2 AN .15 In Stage 2, and after
14K  n #X is the maximal number of times that a player may have to play.
15Note that if after the rst n steps all agents proposed (NP; 0) the game does not move to Stage
2 and ends with the outcome ((;); ;).
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knowing (x^; k^; {^), agents decide sequentially whether or not they would like to use
the public good at level x^ with at least k^ users. The set of participation strategies of
agent i at the subgame starting at (x^; k^; {^) 2 AN ,  (x^; k^; {^), is the set of functions
Bi(x^; k^; {^) =
n
bi[x^; k^; {^] : 2
fj2N jj<ig ! fu; nug
o
;
where bi[x^; k^; {^] (S) species agent is willingness to use the public good at level x^
(when {^ made the proposal (x^; k^) and k^ users are necessary), given that the set
S 2 2fj2N jj<ig of agents have already announced that they are willing to do so, and
the set fj 2 N jj < ig nS of agents have announced that they are not. Let Bi =S
(x^;k^;^{)2AN Bi(x^; k^; {^) denote the set of participation strategies of agent i in Stage
2 and let bi be a generic element of this set. Let Gi = Fi  Bi denote the set of
strategies of agent i. A strategy prole g = (f; b) 2 F  B is a n-tuple of strategies,
where F = F1      Fn and B = B1     Bn. Let G = G1     Gn be the set
of strategy proles.
5.2 Outcome Functions
Given a consumption strategy prole f 2 F , let pm(f) be the proposal made by agent
m [modn] according to f at step m of Stage 1, and let M be the last step of Stage 1.
Let h(f) = (p1(f); :::; pM(f)) be the history generated by f . The outcome of Stage 1
is
o1(f) =
8>><>>:
((;); ;) if h(f) = ((NP; 0); :::; (NP; 0)| {z }
n times
)
(x^; k^; {^) otherwise,
where (x^; k^; {^) is dened in the obvious (but tedious) way. Given a consumption
strategy prole f 2 F dene, for each agent i 2 N ,
"1(f)i =
8<: "0 if 9 1  m M s.t. i = m [modn] ; pm(f) 6= (NP; 0), and i 6= {^0 otherwise;
namely, "1(f)i = "0 means that agent i has made some proposal and none of them
has been selected, and therefore i has to burden the "0 cost. Namely,
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Let (x^; k^; {^) 2 A  N be the outcome of Stage 1. Given the participation strat-
egy prole b 2 B; dene recursively (in the obvious and tedious way) the indicator
function of the decision of agent j in the subgame starting at (x^; k^; {^) as
j(b[x^; k^; {^]) =
8<: 1 if agent j announced u0 if agent j announced nu.
Let S(b[x^; k^; {^])  fj 2 N j j(b[x^; k^; {^]) = 1g be the set of agents that announced their
willingness to be a user along the play generated by the participation strategy prole
b[x^; k^; {^]. Then, the outcome of Stage 2 starting at (x^; k^; {^) generated by b[x^; k^; {^] is
o2(b[x^; k^; {^]) =
8<: (x^; S(b[x^; k^; {^])) if #S(b[x^; k^; {^])  k^(x^; ;) otherwise;
that is, the set of nal users is the set of agents who announced u, S(b[x^; k^; {^]), as
long as its cardinality is larger or equal than k^; otherwise, no agent becomes a user.
Moreover, dene
"2(b[x^; k^; {^]) =
8<: "00 if either o2(b[x^; k^; {^]) = (x^; ;) or  {^(b[x^; k^; {^]) = 00 otherwise;
namely, "2(b[x^; k^; {^]) = "00 indicates that agent {^ (who proposed (x^; k^)) is not a nal
user of the public good, and therefore {^ has to burden the "00 cost.
Finally dene the outcome function o : G! A of the overall extensive-game form
  as follows. For each (f; b) = ((f1; b1) ; :::; (fn; bn)) 2 G,
o (f; b) =
8<: o2(b[o1(f)]) if o1(f) 6= ((;); ;)((;); ;) otherwise.
Additionally, to keep track of who has to burden a " cost, given a strategy prole
(f; b) 2 G, dene, for each i 2 N ,
"i(f; b) =
8<: "2(b[o1(f)]) if i = {^, where {^ is s.t. o1(f) = (x^; k^; {^)"1(f)i otherwise.
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Let R 2 R be given. We prove Theorem 1 by rst arguing that the game  (R) has a
unique SPNE outcome (Lemma 4) and by showing that it belongs to the e¢ cient and
stable set with maximal participation (Lemmata 5 and 6). Let (f; b) be s SPNE of
 (R) and let o(f; b)  (x; S) 2 A be its outcome. We rst state two claims without
proof.16
Claim 1 For all i =2 S, "i(f; b) = 0.
Claim 2 For all i 2 N , (x; S)Ri(x; ;):
Since preference relations satisfy (Strict), we can apply the standard backwards
induction argument to show that the game  (R) has a unique SPNE outcome.
Lemma 4 The game  (R) has a unique SPNE outcome.
Proof Let (x^; k^; {^) be the outcome of Stage 1. The subgame  (x^; k^; {^) is of perfect
information and at each information set decision makers preferences over choices are
strict. Thus,  (x^; k^; {^) has a unique SPNE outcome which can be easily identied as
follows: for every SPNE participation strategy prole b[x^; k^; {^] of  (x^; k^; {^),
o2(b[x^; k^; {^]) =
8<: (x^; Sx^) if #Sx^  k^(x^; ;) otherwise, (6)
where Sx^ is the maximal stable set of users at x^.
To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exist two di¤erent SPNE equilibrium
outcomes (x; Sx) = o(f; b) 6= o(f 0; b0) = (y; Sy): Since  (R) is a nite game in extensive
form with perfect information, the backwards induction principle and condition (6)
imply that there exists i 2 N and hm 1 = (p1(f); :::; pm 1(f)) = (p1(f 0); :::; pm 1(f 0)),
where i = m [modn] ; such that
fi(h
m 1) 6= f 0i(hm 1) (7)
16Claims 1 and 2 are immediately implied by the fact that (f; b) is a SPNE of  (R). In particular,
they hold because each agent i has always available the strategy consisting of never making a proposal
in Stage 1 and declaring nu in Stage 2; regardless of the other agentsbehavior.
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and (x; Sx)Ii(y; Sy): By (Strict), i =2 Sx[Sy: By (7), either fi(hm 1) 6= (NP; 0) and
"i(f; b) 6= 0 or f 0i(hm 1) 6= (NP; 0) and "i(f 0; b0) 6= 0: This contradicts Claim 1. 
Let ES(R) = f(y; Sy) 2 A j (y; Sy) is stable and e¢ cient relative to yg be the set
of allocations identied in Lemma 1 and let
MES(R) = f(y; Sy) 2 ES(R) j #Sy  #Sz for all z 2 X such that (z; Sz) 2 ES(R)g
be the subset of those allocations in ES(R) with a larger number of users. Observe
that the e¢ cient and stable set with maximal participations MP (R) is equal to the
intersection between the set MES(R) and the set of e¢ cient allocations under R.
Next Lemma says that the unique SPNE outcome of  (R) belongs to MES(R):
Lemma 5 Let (x; S) be the SPNE outcome of  (R). Then, (x; S) 2MES(R):
Proof Let (x; S) be the SPNE outcome of  (R) and let y = (fz 2 X j (z; Sz) 2
MES(R)g) be the winner, according to, of the set of levels of the public good among
those that; together with their corresponding sets of users, belong to MES(R). We
rst show that
#S  #Sy: (8)
Assume otherwise; i.e., #Sy > #S. By (Apa), and since (y; Sy) is stable and e¢ cient
relative to y, there exists i 2 SynS such that (y; Sy)Pi(x; S). Let m be the step such
that pm+1(f) =    = pm+n 1(f) = (NP; 0) and let m0 the last step in which agent
i plays at Stage 1; i.e., m  m0  m + n   1 and i = m0[modn]: Consider agent is
deviation ~fi from f such that ~fi is equal to fi in all histories except in the history
~hm
0 1; where ~fi(~hm
0 1) = (y;#Sy) and ~fi(~hm
00
) = (NP ; 0) for all m00 > m0 with i =
m00[modn]: If o(( ~fi; f i); b) = (y; Sy) then ~fi is a protable deviation, contradicting
that (f; b) is a SPNE of  (R): If o(( ~fi; f i); b) 6= (y; Sy), then by denition of y,
o(( ~fi; f i); b) = (z; ;) for some z 2 X. Hence, there exists some agent j 6= i and
step m > m0 with the properties that j = m[modn], p m( ~fi; f i) 6= (NP; 0) and
p m( ~fi; f i) =    = p m+n 1( ~fi; f i) = (NP; 0). Thus, "j(( ~fi; f i); b) = "00; i.e., j
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burdens the "00 cost since he makes the nal proposal at some step m > m0 and j is
not a user in the allocation (z; ;): Since the "00 cost is worse that the "0 cost, even
if agent j has made a proposal at some earlier step m^ < m0; to make the winning
proposal at step m cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy. Thus, (8) holds.
If S = ; then, by (6) and Claims 1 and 2, (x; ;) 2 ES(R). By (8), (x; ;) 2
MES(R). Assume S 6= ;. Then, by (6), S = Sx; i.e., (x; S) 2 ES(R): By (8),
#S  #Sy. Thus, (x; S) 2MES(R): 
Claim 3 below states that the unique SPNE outcome of  (R) can be obtained by
an equilibrium participation strategy prole that generates in Stage 1 a very simple
history.
Claim 3 Let (f; b) be a SPNE of  (R) and let o(f; b) = (x; Sx) be its outcome.
Then, there exists f^ 2 F such that (f^ ; b) is a SPNE of  (R) and
h(f^) = ((NP; 0); :::; (NP; 0)| {z }
(i 1) times
; (x;#Sx)| {z }
step i
; (NP; 0); :::; (NP; 0)| {z }
(n 1) times
);
where i 2 Sx and for all j 2 Sxnfig, j > i.17
It is easy to show that Claim 3 holds because if (f^ ; b) has a protable deviation
then (f; b) has also a protable deviation.
Lemma 6 Let (f; b) be a SPNE of  (R): Then, o(f; b) is e¢ cient under R.
Proof Describe the set MES(R) as f(x1; Sx1); :::; (xZ ; SxZ )g; where x1      xZ :
For all 1  q < q0  Z, #Sxq = #Sxq0 holds.
Assume (x1; Sx1) is e¢ cient under R and o(f; b) = (xq; Sxq) holds for q > 1:
Since (x1; Sx1) is e¢ cient under R; by (Strict), there exists i 2 Sx1nSxq such that
(x1; Sx1)Pi(xq; Sxq): Letm be the step such that pm+1(f) =  = pm+n 1(f) = (NP; 0)
and let m  m0  m + n   1 be such i = m0[modn]: Consider agent is deviation ~fi
from f such that ~fi is equal to fi in all histories except in the history hm
0 1; where
17Obviously, o(f^ ; b) = (x; Sx):
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~fi(h
m0 1) = (x1;#Sx1): Using an argument similar to the one already used in the
proof of Lemma 5, we obtain a contradiction with the fact that (f; b) is a SPNE of
 (R): Thus, either (x1; Sx1) is e¢ cient under R and o(f; b) = (x1; Sx1), in which case
the statement of the lemma follows, or (x1; Sx1) is not e¢ cient under R.
Assume (x1; Sx1) is not e¢ cient under R. Let T be the smallest integer such that
1  T  Z and (xT ; SxT ) 2MES(R), (xT ; SxT )PD(x1; Sx1) and (xT ; SxT ) is e¢ cient
under R. We now show that there exists such T: Since (x1; Sx1) is not e¢ cient under
R, by Lemma 2, there exists y 2 X such that (y; Sy)PD(x1; Sx1): Hence, for all i 2 N ,
(y; Sy)Ri(x1; Sx1): (9)
If #Sy < #Sx1 then there exists i 2 Sx1nSy such that, by (Apa), (Strict), and (9),
(y; Sy)Ii(y; ;)Ii(x; ;)Ii(x1; Sx1nfig)Pi(x1; Sx1);
contradicting that (x1; Sx1) is stable under R: Thus, #Sy  #Sx1 : Since (x1; Sx1) 2
MES(R), #Sy = #Sx1 : Hence, (y; Sy) 2 MES(R) and since this set is nite, T
is well-dened. Observe that, by its denition, (i) if (xt; Sxt) is such that 1 
t < T and (xt; Sxt)PD(x1; Sx1) then (xT ; SxT )PD(xt; Sxt); and (ii), by (Strict),
if (xT ; SxT )PD(xt; Sxt) then Sxt = SxT : Hence, there exists a sequence
(x1; Sx1); (xt1 ; Sxt1 ); :::; (xts ; Sxts ); (xT ; SxT )
in MES(R) such that
x1  xt1      xts  xT (10)
and
(xT ; SxT )PD(xts ; Sxts )PD    PD(xt1 ; Sxt1 )PD(x1; Sx1): (11)
Observe that (10) and (11) hold simultaneously without loss of generality, because if
we had t and t0 with the property that (xT ; SxT )PD(xt; Sxt)PD(xt0 ; Sxt0 )PD(x1; Sx1)
and x1  xt  xt0  xT then, we could proceed by eliminating (xt; Sxt) in the
sequence. However, we will have to take care of this possibility at the beginning of
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Case II below. Let Q be the set of those indices; i.e., Q = f1; t1; :::; ts; Tg: Again,
observe that
Sx1 = Sxt1 =    = Sxts = SxT : (12)
We now show that o(f; b) = (xT ; SxT ): Assume not. By Lemma 5, there exists
1  q  Z such that o(f; b) = (xq; Sxq) 6= (xT ; SxT ): By Claim 3, we can assume that
h(f) = ((NP; 0); :::; (NP; 0)| {z }
(i 1) times
; (xq;#Sxq)| {z }
step i
; (NP; 0); :::; (NP; 0)| {z }
(n 1) times
); (13)
where i 2 Sxq and for all j 2 Sxqnfig, j > i: We distinguish between two cases.
Case I: q 2 Q: Then, by (12), Sxq = SxT : Consider agent is deviation ~fi from f
such that ~fi is equal to fi in all histories except in the history hi 1; where ~fi(hi 1) =
(xT ;#SxT ); i.e., agent i instead of proposing (xq;#Sxq) proposes (xT ;#SxT ): It is
easy to see that o(( ~fi; f i); b) = (xT ; SxT ) holds because (xT ; SxT )PD(xq; Sxq) and
o(f; b) = (xq; Sxq) is a SPNE outcome of  (R). Thus, the deviation ~fi is protable,
contradicting that (f; b) is a SPNE of  (R).
Case II: q =2 Q. If (xq; Sxq)PD(x1; Sx1) then (xT ; SxT )PD(xq; Sxq) and Sxq = SxT
(i.e., (xq; Sxq) was eliminated in the sequence going from (x1; Sx1) to (xT ; SxT ) to
make sure that conditions (10) and (11) hold simultaneously). Since Sxq = SxT
we can proceed as in Case I above and obtain a contradiction with the fact that
(f; b) is a SPNE of  (R): Thus, assume (xq; Sxq) does not Pareto dominate (x1; Sx1).
Then, there exists j 2 Sx1 such that (x1; Sx1)Pj(xq; Sxq): Consider agent js deviation
~fj from f such that ~fj is equal to fj in all histories except in the history hj 1 =
(p1(f); :::; pj 1(f)); where ~fj(hj 1) = (x1;#Sx1): Observe that, by (13) and the fact
that x1  xq, the proposal pj = (x1;#Sx1) is feasible for agent j after the history
hj 1: By using an argument similar to one already used in the proof of Lemma 5 and
the fact that x1  xt holds for all 1 < t  Z, it follows that o(( ~fj; f j); b) = (x1; Sx1):
Thus, the deviation ~fj is protable, which contradicts that (f; b) is a SPNE of  (R).

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The statement of Theorem 1 follows from Lemmata 4, 5, and 6. Observe that the
SPNE outcome o(f; b) of  (R) is uniquely identied from R, but it depends on the
given linear order  :18 Denote this outcome by (x; Sx): That is, given ; dene the
social choice function ' : R ! A as follows: for each R 2 R; '(R) = (x; Sx):
Hence, the following Corollary holds.
Corollary 1 The extensive-game form   implements in SPNE the social choice
function ' : R! A:
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